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Abstract
This article assesses the reasons for frequent national-level 
administrative reforms in New Zealand and reflects on their potential 
consequences. It explores three potential reasons: the particularities of 
Wellington as a highly conducive place for ideas to be shared between 
decision makers and academics; the characteristics of New Zealand 
institutions; and the effects of innovations themselves as drivers of 
disappointment and more innovation. The article reflects on reforms 
as drivers of continuous and incremental improvements as opposed 
to a hyper-innovative, politically driven administrative system. It 
concludes by stressing the importance of incorporating experiences 
‘from the bottom’ in reform processes, and reliance on reflective 
mechanisms capable of creating opportunities for incremental, 
piecemeal and often ‘inelegant’ administrative adjustments.
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New Zealand is internationally known as a place where machinery of government reforms have 
always gone faster and further (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011). Its vibrant and radical 
government restructuring culture has 
been recognised by internal and external 
observers. Far from one-off phenomena, 
machinery of government changes appear 
as a continuous theme across parties in 
government (Boston et al., 1996; Lodge 
and Gill, 2014). International attention 
towards New Zealand arguably peaked 
following the late 1980s and early 1990s 
reforms that represented the high tide of 
transaction cost economics that influenced 
New Public Management (NPM) reforms. 
Since then, machinery of government 
changes have continued apace, leading, in 
turn, to considerable academic interest in 
‘post-NPM’ changes in the early 2000s and 
subsequently. 
The ongoing tinkering with the 
machinery of government presents a 
number of questions. For one, why is New 
Zealand such an ongoing poster child for 
the latest paradigm in administrative 
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reforms? Second, why is New Zealand 
witnessing a frequent churn in machinery 
of government changes? According to Yui 
and Gregory (2018), New Zealand 
witnessed approximately 259 departmental 
restructurings between the 1960s and 1997. 
In contrast, Davis and colleagues noted that 
there were 247 restructurings in Australia 
(involving 127 creations and 120 abolitions), 
96 in Canada (46 creations and 50 
abolitions) and 100 in the United Kingdom 
(55 creations and 45 abolitions) (Davis et 
al., 1999). This article assesses the reasons 
for this New Zealand trend of frequent 
administrative reforms and reflects on the 
potential consequences of a ‘hyper-
innovative’ governmental environment. 
Particular interest is paid to the 2019 
reforms directed at so-called Crown 
entities. Crown entities have been one of 
the main targets of this frequent tinkering 
with the machinery of government. Since 
their creation as semi-autonomous 
government agencies in 1989, there have 
been revisions of their mandates and 
governance structure in order to reduce 
‘fragmentation’ (State Services Commission, 
2019). In February 2018 the State Services 
Commission (SSC) proposed a new 
package of changes in order to amend the 
Crown Entities Act. These recent reforms 
are even broader than the former and 
include revisions to the State Sector Act 
1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989. 
These changes, approved by Cabinet and 
announced by the minister of state services 
on 26 June 2019, have been portrayed as a 
major reform of New Zealand public 
services. 
Using the 2019 reforms as a case study, 
the article explores three potential reasons 
for New Zealand’s high rate of 
administrative reforms. The first is linked 
to the power of networks, ideas 
‘bandwagons’ and the particularities of 
Wellington as a highly conducive place for 
ideas to be shared between decision makers 
and academics. The second points to the 
characteristics of New Zealand institutions. 
It is associated with the ‘incomplete’ 
proportional representation system and the 
hidden majoritarian wiring of the now 
consensual system. Third, the effect of 
innovations themselves as drivers of 
disappointment and more innovation is 
explored. Finally, the article reflects on 
reforms as drivers of ‘continuous 
improvement’ as opposed to a hyper-
innovative, politically driven administrative 
system. It concludes by making some 
recommendations for continuous 
improvement to materialise in the New 
Zealand case.
An idea whose time has come?
A close look at the proposed 2019 reforms 
shows a close connection to what has 
widely become known as post-New 
Public Management. The label suggests 
overall a move beyond the central pillars 
of NPM, namely an emphasis on greater 
codification (i.e. less discretion) and a 
greater reluctance to emulate ‘business’ 
practices in government. More specifically, 
four main characteristics of post-NPM 
can be distinguished: a reorganisation 
of accountability lines and operational 
activities; the extent of political control; 
the relationship between citizens and the 
public sector; and the nature of ‘public 
service bargains’. 
First, in terms of organisation, post-
NPM seems to refer to the ‘(re-)
centralization of the vertical dimensions 
and functional integration of the horizontal 
dimension’ (Reiter and Klenk, 2018, p.8; 
Andersson and Liff, 2012, pp.837–8; 
Egeberg and Trondal, 2016, pp.85–6; Zafra-
Gómez, Rodriguez-Bolıvar and Alcaide 
Munoz, 2012, pp.714–15). Therefore, it 
implies the verticalisation and 
centralisation of accountability, while 
operational activities are to be integrated 
horizontally within departments or units. 
This marks a move away from NPM, with 
its emphasis on ‘disaggregation’.
This particular theme of ‘re-integration’ 
is clearly evident in the proposed New 
Zealand reforms. The published 
information emphasises the need to ‘break 
down the silos of the current system and 
create an environment based on collective 
responsibility and co-ordinated action that 
delivers great outcomes to New Zealand’ 
(State Services Commission, 2018a, p.1). 
Additionally, by requiring written consent 
for the appointment of executives to 
statutory Crown entities and standardising 
their job titles, appointment terms and pay 
bands, vertical lines of accountability are 
considerably strengthened. Finally, the new 
organisational forms of public service 
executive boards, public service joint 
ventures, executive agencies and statutory 
officers provide for functional horizontal 
integration. The idea of ‘joined-up citizen-
facing services’ that would allow 
departments to ‘work together horizontally, 
when faced with issues that cut across 
departmental boundaries’ is also explicitly 
mentioned by the SSC reform proposal 
documents, further confirming the 
alignment with commonly accepted post-
NPM conceptualisations (ibid.).
A second theme relates to political 
control over public sector organisations. 
NPM was said to have reduced 
opportunities for central political direction, 
thereby aggravating coordination problems 
(Althaus and Vakil, 2013) while, however, 
not exempting politicians from taking the 
‘blame flak’ in case of policy failure. In 
terms of post-NPM, a central theme 
therefore has been the idea of politicians 
reclaiming direct control over autonomous 
departments, suggesting a movement 
towards a ‘re-politicization of public 
service delivery’ (Reiter and Klenk, 2018, 
p.10). 
The vertical lines of accountability to 
be established between Crown entities and 
the SSC are a strong indication of this ‘re-
politicisation’ trend in current New 
Zealand reforms. The standardisation of 
public service principles and values on 
matters of integrity and proper conduct, as 
A close look at the proposed 2019 
reforms shows a close connection to 
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well as the expansion of SSC investigatory 
and inquiry capacities on these issues, 
point further to the recreation of direct 
political control over subordinated 
organisations. The reform documents have 
a strong flavour of reassertion of political 
control: the proposal is to ‘expand the 
definition of the Public Service to a range 
of Crown entities’ either by the 
‘appointment or removal of board members 
or the ability of Ministers to direct 
government agencies to “have regard” to 
Government policy’ (State Services 
Commission, 2018b).
A further central part of standard post-
NPM classification exercises refers to the 
relationship between the public sector and 
citizens. Here the main change relates to a 
shift away from the NPM view that regards 
citizens as ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’ towards 
a perspective that emphasises democratic 
citizenship, especially in terms of enhanced 
participation rights. Post-NPM also points 
to a shift away from an emphasis on 
outputs towards outcomes and inputs 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2011, p.141). 
Elements of these themes are also present 
in the current reform proposal documents. 
There is a strong emphasis on ethical 
behaviour and conduct monitoring by the 
SSC. In addition, it is proposed to 
strengthen the participation of Mäori in 
leadership positions. While the first clearly 
refers to fair and standardised procedures 
of government monitoring (process-based 
legitimacy), the second emphasises the 
importance of a representative bureaucracy 
for the achievement of better outcomes, 
which points to the importance of inputs 
for the legitimacy of government.
The fourth and final characteristic of 
post-NPM relates to changes in the ‘public 
service bargain’, the ‘explicit or implicit 
agreements between public servants and 
those they serve’ (Hood and Lodge, 2006, 
p.6). Public service bargains involve how 
rewards are allocated, the types of 
competencies required from civil servants 
and the nature of their loyalty. A move 
away from NPM towards post-NPM 
would be signalled by a move away from 
individualised performance pay regimes, 
a move towards an emphasis on 
collaborative and ‘boundary-spanning 
competencies’, and a strengthening of 
‘ w h o l e - o f - gove r n m e n t ’ l oya l t y 
understandings. In an earlier study of New 
Zealand machinery of government 
changes, Lodge and Gill (2011, p.151) 
observed, for instance, that the emphasis 
on individualised performance pay 
rewards had been moving towards team-
based incentives. While not explicitly 
mentioned, the end of performance pay 
was announced by the New Zealand 
minister of state services, Chris Hipkins 
(Hipkins, 2018). Similarly, the proposed 
organisational reforms are focused on the 
idea of ‘joined-up’ government and 
collaboration skills are to play a more 
prominent role, in particular with the 
introduction of the senior leaders service. 
Finally, the strong focus on developing a 
unified system for the enforcement of 
conduct and ethical principles points to 
a departure from the discretionary space 
of loyalty arrangements towards stronger 
consideration of rules and ethics.
Table 1 highlights how key reform 
proposals seem to relate closely to ideas 
associated with post-NPM. In doing so, the 
proposed reforms seem to reflect an ‘idea 
whose time has come’, not just in reflecting 
ideas enjoying international currency in 
academic and practitioner discourse but 
also in responding to NPM, namely its 
emphasis on a highly disaggregated public 
sector, individualised reward incentives, 
and narrowly defined organisational 
outputs.
The wider literature on innovation 
highlights the existence of an institutional 
environment in which organisations are 
capable of sharing advanced knowledge – 
where knowledge ‘is free to flow’ (Bekkers, 
Edelenbos and Steijn, 2011, p.3). One 
explanation for the close connection 
between wider academic and practitioner 
discussion regarding post-NPM and their 
utilisation in New Zealand reform 
discussions is the existence of closely-knit 
networks that characterise Wellington, and 
the ties between government and academia. 
Across decades, numbers of academics have 
been directly involved in advising New 
Zealand governments, and, in turn, 
governments have been responsive to their 
ideas. The 2019 reform proposals are no 
different, as evidenced in the numerous 
academic submissions to the public 
consultation surrounding them. This close 
connection might offer a wider explanation 
as to why New Zealand machinery of 
government discussions are so often 
regarded as ‘poster children’ for the latest 
administrative reform doctrines.
At the same time, it should also be 
noted that ideas regarding post-NPM have 
been around since the mid-2000s, if not 
earlier. They emerged in almost immediate 
response to administrative reforms and 
New Zealand was regarded, prior to the Key 
and English administrations, as the leading 
example of post-NPM already (especially 
in the context of the Crown Entity Act 
2004: see Lodge and Gill, 2011). In that 
sense, post-NPM has ‘returned from the 
grave’ and its time has certainly come in 
the context of party political change in New 
Zealand government.
Table 1: Summary of the extent to which 2019 proposed reforms reflect post-NPM trends
REFORM 
 
Post-NPM
Crown enity 
reforms
Four new 
organisational 
models
Improved 
Crown/Ma-ori 
relationship
Senior leaders 
service (SLS)
Long-term 
insights briefings
Re-centralisation 
and functional 
intergration
✔ ✔ ✔
Re-politicisation 
of the public 
service
✔
From outputs to 
process-based 
accountability
✔ ✔ ✔
Valorisation 
of boundary-
spanning 
and cultural 
competencies
✔ ✔
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Institutional environment
While party political change and immediate 
reaction to negative or disappointment 
effects point to explanations as to the 
nature of the current machinery of 
government reform proposals, such an 
account cannot explain why machinery of 
government reforms are such a constant 
feature in New Zealand politics. One 
traditional suspect that might account 
for the continued fascination with 
machinery of government debates are 
national institutions. According to this 
view, reforms are a consequence of the 
characteristics of a country’s politico-
administrative environment, including 
elements such as the legislative structure, 
the extent of political centralisation, 
consensus requirements of decision-
making processes and administrative 
culture.
New Zealand has traditionally been 
placed among the most centralised and 
majoritarian countries in the world (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2011, p.55). Both features 
are said to account for the extent and speed 
of  political reforms, including 
administrative reforms, as ‘losers’ are 
unlikely to find political venues to veto or 
frustrate proposals. After the 1996 electoral 
reforms that replaced ‘first past the post’ 
with a mixed-member proportional 
(MMP) electoral system, one would assume 
that New Zealand’s propensity to launch 
extensive reforms had been reduced. 
However, there continue to be, especially 
in comparative terms, considerable 
majoritarian features. Although the new 
system did usher in a multiparty parliament, 
changing the electoral system has 
increasingly been seen to be only one of 
the several elements required for effectively 
addressing the high speed of executive and 
parliamentary decision making in New 
Zealand (Boston and Eichbaum, 2014, 
p.376).
Continued features that encourage far-
reaching and speedy decision making by 
the New Zealand political centre include 
New Zealand’s unitary state nature and its 
unicameralism. Furthermore, New Zealand 
counts only six entrenched laws or clauses 
(that can only be changed by vote by an 
extra large majority of more than 75% of 
the House of Representatives or more than 
50% at a referendum), and the 
constitutional system in New Zealand does 
not require any legislative changes for 
administrative reforms to take place 
(Boston et al., 1996). Third, following a 
recommendation of the McCarthy 
Commission in 1962, the State Services 
Commission was required to focus on 
efficient management (in addition to 
personnel issues) and to continually review 
the machinery of government (ibid.). 
Administrative reforms are, therefore, part 
of the SSC’s mandate, which might provide 
an additional incentive for their constant 
activity in this realm. In addition, an 
entrenched ‘managerialist culture’ across 
the New Zealand public administration (at 
least since the 1980s) might be seen as 
further encouraging continued machinery 
of government tinkering as part of wider 
‘bureau shaping’ behaviours that seek to 
expand and consolidate controls (Dunleavy, 
1991; Norman and Gill, 2011; Yui and 
Gregory, 2018).
According to this view, therefore, the 
latest round of reform proposals is a 
consequence of the characteristics of New 
Zealand’s politico-administrative 
environment, including its unicameral 
legislative structure, the centralised 
decision-making process, and continued 
traces of majoritarian politics. 
Fiascos and disappointment
Progress in public management is neither 
linear nor based on cumulative knowledge. 
Rather, change in public management is 
usually reactive to disappointment and 
failures in existing arrangements. The 
cumulation of negative consequences and 
disappointment effects leads to growing 
opposition and endorsement of alternative 
reform ideas. In other words, despite all 
the glossy documents and promises of 
a bright new administrative future, the 
inevitable disappointment effects and 
blame games will unavoidably give way to 
the next round of administrative reform 
proposals. As shown by Moran, the era of 
hyper-innovation that characterised the 
UK between 1970 and 1990 (with intensive 
privatisation, economic and regulatory 
reforms) was also an era that increasingly 
invited policy fiasco. In his words, ‘[f]iasco 
is both a reflection of hyper-innovation 
and a force driving the state to even greater 
frenzies of hyper-innovation’ (Moran, 2003, 
p.156). According to Moran, examples 
of British governance-generated policy 
fiascos included the BSE (mad cow disease) 
outbreak, rail privatisation, the 1995 
Barings Bank collapse and the Millennium 
Dome. In New Zealand, hyper-innovation 
might lead to fiascos that will constantly 
motivate more reforms, with the leaky 
buildings saga and the Pike River disaster 
being cases in point.
So, can the point be made that New 
Zealand is caught up in its very own elite-
generated frenzy of machinery of 
government-related hyper-innovation? 
Unsurprisingly, a disappointment-based 
account is, at first sight at least, not evident 
in the SSC documents concerning the 
current reforms. Instead, the theme is one 
of reform reinforcement. It is noted that 
since the NPM reforms of the late 1980s 
What is required, however, is a move 
beyond an emphasis on reform ‘purity’ 
that is quickly implemented. Maybe 
it is time to also rely on incremental 
changes, those that emerge from 
experience ‘from the bottom’ rather 
than from the whiteboards of central 
government agencies.
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New Zealand has consistently moved from 
a state of perceived fragmentation towards 
more centralisation or combination of 
tasks and departmental roles (Yui and 
Gregory, 2018). Second, in one of their pre-
consultation documents the SSC argues 
that amendments to the State Sector Act in 
2013 did not fundamentally change the 
system, and justifies current reforms on the 
basis that the directions of change 
originally hoped for did not materialise:
the improvements made to the State 
Sector Act 1988 through the 2013 
amendments did not fundamentally 
change the system. Since then, we have 
not achieved the direction of change 
that was hoped for, and the barriers to 
a unified public service system 
approach are more evident than ever. 
(State Services Commission, 2018a, p.2)
Nevertheless, it is plausible to at least 
suggest that the contemporary reform 
proposals are reactive to the perceived 
‘excesses’ of the NPM past, such as in 
emphasising joining up over the side effects 
of disaggregation, the concern with the 
negative consequences of performance pay, 
and the re-emphasis on codified conduct 
rules. 
Conclusion: continuous improvement or 
hyper-innovation?
As noted, New Zealand has attracted 
considerable attention for its continued 
machinery of government-related changes. 
One reason for this is that New Zealand is 
continuously associated with ‘pure reform’ 
leadership in the sense not just of leading 
the world in administrative reform activity, 
but also of applying ‘pure’ reform proposals. 
The 2019 reforms are a case in point in that 
they reflect post-NPM-related changes. 
Why, however, New Zealand continues 
to embrace machinery of government 
reforms has received far less attention. In 
this short piece we can only point to three 
(interdependent) factors: the close ties 
between practice and academia in reform 
discussions in a political system that 
remains highly centralised and, despite 
proportional representation, majoritarian. 
These features provide for the opportunity 
for continued machinery of government 
reforms. The motive for continued 
machinery of government changes lies 
in the side effects and consequences of 
previous administrative reforms. In that 
sense, New Zealand could be argued to be 
caught up in its own policy frenzy of hyper-
innovation in which actors ‘overcorrect’ (at 
least in terms of doctrinal argumentation) 
in view of perceived shortcomings and 
failures of existing arrangements. 
However, there are ways out of such a 
seemingly inevitable cycle of hyper-
innovation. For one, there is considerable 
reflective capacity in the New Zealand 
system, one that is supported by the close 
interactions between practice and academia. 
Spaces for an open exchange over 
accumulated experiences do exist and 
could be further integrated into reform 
discussions. What is required, however, is 
a move beyond an emphasis on reform 
‘purity’ that is quickly implemented. Maybe 
it is time to also rely on incremental 
changes, those that emerge from experience 
‘from the bottom’ rather than from the 
whiteboards of central government 
agencies. This is not to say that such 
feedback mechanisms do not already exist, 
but they should be seen to encourage 
piecemeal, often ‘inelegant’ adjustments to 
existing arrangements. Such an incremental 
path will support the building of reflective 
capacity across the public sector and is 
more likely to embed ongoing reform than 
a constant search for new ‘paradigms’. 
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